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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 08/02/2011

Accident number: 594

Accident time: 08:45

Accident Date: 04/05/2010

Where it occurred: AF10809/09388/ MF
0189, Sorkhdiwal
village, Rodat district,
Nangarhar province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment
(?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 07/06/2010

ID original source: Ref: 114

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 08/02/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a “Lessons
Learned” summary provided as a PDF file. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some
of the original formatting being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be
revised as more information becomes available.
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The cover letter and Lessons Learned summary are reproduced below, edited for anonymity.
Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)
Ref # 114
File: OPS/14/09
To: See Distribution List
From: [Name removed], Chief of Operations, MACCA, Kabul
Date: 07 June 2010
Subject: Investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group] DT 07 Demining
Accident
Attached please find the investigation report and lessons learned of demining accident
occurred on 04 May 2010 at 08.45 in sorkhdiwal village, rodat district of Nangarhar province.
Best regards,
Distribution List
Complete investigation Report to: [Demining group]
Lessons Learned to: [All demining agencies active in Afghanistan at the time.]
MDC, RONCO, HT, MCPA, DDG, ATC, JMAS, PM/WRA, HDI, DAFA, G4S, EODT, ACL,
CMCC, MTI, NDSS, PSS, UXB, AMACs (7).
For Information:
MACCA, Chief of Staff DMC, Director
Operations Staff

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 07 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC East to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the De-miner DT-07 of [Demining group]. The accident occurred at
08:45 hours on 04 May 2010 at minefield number AF108091093881 ME 0189, located in
Sorkhdiwal village, Rodat district of Nangarhar Province.
SUMMARY:
AF10809/09388/ MF 0189 located about 25km to the east of the Jalalabad City. This area is
contaminated with anti-personnel mines by Russian troops in 1984. Because of its strategic
location, this area was used as security belt around Jalalabad city and nearby military areas
and positions.
[Demining group] DT-07 was tasked to start clearance operation on 01 April 2010. Size of the
area is 83912sqm. During the clearance operations, 22194sqm area cleared and one AP
mine was found/ destroyed by team before the accident happens.
On 04 May 2010 at 08:45 am while [the Victim] the de-miner was excavating a detected
signal in his clearance lane, his bayonet hit top of an anti-personnel PMN mine and caused it
to go off. According to the investigation report, it seems that the de-miner started excavation
directly from the pinpointed spot with his bayonet and caused the explosion and accident.
Unfortunately improper use of PPE caused catastrophic injuries to the face and eyes of the

2

victim deminer. He has lost his right eye, traumatic amputation of right-hand fingers and
sustained some superficial injures on different parts of his body. The command group of
mentioned team failed to control the deminer during the operations and let him work without
visor and in a careless manner.
CONCLUSIONS:
Lack of proper supervision and poor command and control is identified as main contributing
factor, as the deminer was not stopped while he was working without proper use of PPE/visor.
The deminer himself was in a good health condition before the accident, and had not been
suffered from any serious issue to affect his performance, so the next contributing factor for
this accident is carelessness of deminer.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
However corrective actions have been taken by [Demining group] after the internal
investigation, but the following points are to be considered and distributed to the team level by
all demining organizations:
1. Full PPE and visors shall be worn appropriately during the period of demining operations in
the field.
2. The poor performance of command group should be taken into account seriously and
appropriate actions to be taken by operations management team.
3. Strong internal QA system can guarantee the improvement in operations and reduce the
risk of unintended detonation and severe consequence of accidents, so more attention should
be paid to internal QA system.
4. [Demining group] management should provide MACCA Operations department with a
written feedback on all aspects of corrective/preventive actions taken within 7 days, effective
to the issue date of this letter.

Victim Report
Victim number: 778

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Body, severe Face, severe Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eye, Fingers
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field control inadequacy because the Victim
was working without a visor and his error was not corrected. The secondary cause is listed as
Inadequate equipment because the deminer was working with an inappropriate hand-tool that
does not meet the recommendations of IMAS 10.30 and severe hand injury resulted. This is
also a Management Control inadequacy at all levels, because the tool used had been
approved by the UN supported MACCA. The “Inadequate equipment” listed under notes
refers top the issue of an inappropriate tool, the unsafe AK bayonet.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years
This is in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS which they are required to apply. The
summary of the accident is good, and its presence implies that a full and comprehensive
accident investigation was made, but not made available for others to learn from.
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